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Courts-Martial and the Commander
KENNETH J. HODSON*
The most serious shortcoming in our military justice system is the
danger of undue command influence over courts-martial.... In
addition to the danger presented by command influence, the mili-
tary justice system denies a defendant other rights fundamental
to a free society.'
-- Senator Birch Bayh
In the fiscal year ending June 1972, three thousand three hun-
dred nineteen soldiers were tried by "felony-type" courts-martial2
* LL.B, Kansas University, 1937; Major General, U.S. Army; Chief
Judge, U.S. Army Court of Military Review; Judge Advocate General of
the Army, 1967-71; former Chairman and present Secretary, Criminal
Law Section, American Bar Association; member ABA Special Com-
mittee of Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent the views of any governmental agency. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Daniel A. Winterbottom, Captain,
Judge Advocate General's Corps; LL.B, University of Virginia, 1969, for
his assistance in carrying out the basic research for most of the article,
checking and editing footnote citations, and doing the final proof reading.
1. 117 CONG. REc. 5306 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh introducing
S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., which would make major changes in the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice).
2. The military court of general criminal jurisdiction, the general court-
martial, can adjudge any sentence not prohibited by law within the maxi-
mum punishment established by the President of the United States for the
offense of which the accused has been convicted. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970).
The court of intermediate jurisdiction, the special court-martial, has ju-
risdiction to try any non-capital offense. The maximum punishment which
it may adjudge is six months confinement, six months forfeiture of two-
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in the Army. Of these, three thousand one hundred ten were con-
victed of some offense for a conviction rate of just under 94%.
Critics of military justice, who are either unaware of, or choose to
ignore, civilian conviction rates,8 frequently point to this conviction
rate as proof that the military system-in which the commander
decides whom to try, selects the members of the jury, and reviews
the results of the trial-is less fair than the civilian justice sys-
tem.- Comparison of these systems, however, reveals that pretrial
and post-trial procedures in the military more closely approach
the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice than
procedures followed in many civilian jurisdictions. Although the
thirds pay, and a bad-conduct discharge. However, the special court-
martial may not adjudge a bad-conduct discharge unless a verbatim
record is made and the accused is provided with lawyer counsel. 10
U.S.C. § 819 (1970). I use the term "felony-type" court-martial to refer
to general courts-martial and to those special courts-martial empowered to
adjudge a bad-conduct discharge. An equivalent term would be "non-
petty offense-type" court-martial. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The lowest mili-
tary court, the summary court-martial, has jurisdiction to try enlisted per-
sons who consent to trial for minor offenses. It can adjudge forfeiture of
two-thirds pay for one month, reduction in grade, and, provided lawyer
counsel is made available to the accused (see Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972), confinement for one month.
3. Federal figures for fiscal year 1972 are not available. In fiscal
year 1971, the Army tried 3,942 persons by felony-type courts-martial.
The term "tried" is used to include those cases which were litigated on
their merits and does not include cases which were dismissed at a pre-
trial hearing, for example, for lack of a speedy trial, or, for example, were
dismissed when a resignation tendered by the accused was accepted. 3,762
soldiers were convicted of some offense, a conviction rate of approximately
95.5%. These figures are taken from Fiscal Year 1971 and Fiscal Year
1972 Report of General and Special (BCD) Court-Martial Data available
from Clerk of Court, United States Army Judiciary, Nassif Building, Falls
Church, Virginia 22041.
During fiscal year 1971 federal courts tried 46,674 persons. 24% of
these cases were dismissed, a percentage which includes dismissals after
commencement of, the prosecution case as well as prior to trial. Of the
cases which were tried and not dismissed, 96% resulted in conviction. See,
Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Federal Offender Datagraphs,
A-18 (1972).
4. The American Bar Association, on the contrary, warns that a "high
acquittal rate is itself a prime indicator of either inadequate exercise of
discretion in making the charge or inadequate preparation for or presen-
tation at trial." ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRnxvNAL JUSTICs,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION, § 3.4 at 84 (1971) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]. The
"Article 32 investigation," 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970), required prior to all gen-
eral courts-martial, and the requirement that the commander budget for
the cash costs of the trial, such as travel and court reporter costs, witness
fees, laboratory tests, etc., serve to keep losing cases out of military
courts. The decision to refer a case to trial by court-martial is affected by
the fact that a high court-martial rate-particularly if it involves military-
type offenses, such as unauthorized absence, disrespect, or disobedience-
has long been considered as an indicator of poor leadership.
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military's system for selecting jurors fails to measure up to the
ABA Standards, and is in need of change, it results in the selection
of jurors who closely resemble the type of persons found on juries
in most state courts.
Senator Bayh has introduced legislation which would establish
a Court-Martial command within the Army and remove the com-
mander from the judicial process.5 While I disagree with the de-
sirability of a separate Court-Martial command, I do agree with
his concept that the prosecuting, judging, and defense functions
should be separated, and I favor removal of the commander from
the system except for post-trial clemency purposes.6 The com-
5. See Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 1971: The Need for Legisla-
tive Reform, 10 A.. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1971), a part of that volume's sym-
posium on military law.
6. See Hodson, The Manual for Courts-Martial-1984, 57 MIL. L. REv. 1(1972), delivered at the first Kenneth J. Hodson Criminal Law Lecture at
The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, April 12,
1972.
While the United States government has three branches, legislative,
executive, and judicial, few would suggest that the judicial branch is
wholly separate from the national community which it serves. Most
knowledgeable observers would agree with Mr. Dooley's perceptive ob-
servation-
No matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' Su-preme Court follows th' iliction returns.
While much of the criticism of military justice finds its source in anti-
military, anti-establishment feelings, even among critics who consider them-
selves to be objective, there is a widespread belief that "true justice,"
whatever that term may mean, cannot exist within the military because
of the influence of the commander in establishing and maintaining com-
munity standards of behavior. It should be obvious that the same type of
community influence is found in civilian communities, where there is pres-
sure on an elected judge-as well as on the members of a jury who must
live in the community after disclosing their vote by a unanimous verdict-
to maintain the standards of conduct that are acceptable to the re-
sponsible members of the community. In a recent address to the American
Bar Association, Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls in England, ob-
served: "Justice is what the right thinking members of society believe to
be fair." It is not basically unfair for the members of the society which
sets the standards of conduct to sit in judgment on those who are alleged
to have violated those standards. In this respect, although its standards
may be stricter, the military community is no different from the civilian
community.
Further, taking the commander completely out of the process would
prevent him from helping in the process of correction and rehabilitation.
If he wants to try to let the accused "soldier" his way out of his difficulty,
I favor giving him the authority. The civilian correctional system is no-
toriously unsuccessful because it puts the accused in the artificial environ-
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mander and his legal advisor are the "government," and their au-
thority prior to and during trial should extend only to filing a
"complaint" with the court and providing a prosecutor. The need
for change, however, exists not because the military system is un-
fair-on the whole, it is probably more protective of the accused's
rights than any other system of criminal justice in use in the states
of the United States-but because it has the reputation of being
unfair. Pertinent is a remark attributed to Justice Holmes: "A
system of justice must not only be good, but it must be seen to be
good."7
This article will examine the three most often criticized aspects
of military justice, all of which involve the commanders' partici-
pation: (1) the decision to charge, (2) the selection of the jury,
and (3) appellate review.
THE DECISION TO CHARGE THE AccusED WITH
COMMITTING AN OFFENSE
Citizens accused by the federal government of capital or "in-
famous" crimes, generally crimes for which confinement for one
year or more may be adjudged, have a Constitutional right to in-
dictment by or presentment of a grand jury. This right is not
applicable to the states,0 and most states permit the prosecutor to
proceed by information, that is, a complaint presented to a magis-
trate.10 In Los Angeles County, for example, less than 1% of the
ment of the prison; giving the soldier the opportunity of trying to rehabili-
tate himself in his own community offers greater prospects of success.
7. Anthony G. Amsterdam of the Stanford University law faculty has
suggested the urgent need to appraise criminal justice, not by a discussion
of rights the criminal has but by examination of the treatment he actually
gets. Amsterdam, We Have Two Kinds of Justice-One for the Poor and
One for Us, 11 INTELLECT. DIG., No. 12 at 49 (Aug. 1972), reprinted from the
Stanford Observer. I agree with this approach, and I am attempting in
this article to compare military and civilian justice at a functional level.
Time and space do not permit exhaustive treatment of every aspect of
the administration of criminal justice, but the article will perhaps provide
a starting point for comparison. An article providing similar treatment is
Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a
Civilian Defendant, 51 Mm. L. Ray. 1 (1971), reprinted from a Symposium
on Justice in the Military at 22 MA= L. REv. 105 (1970). See also
Nichols, The Justice of Military Justice, 12 WM. & MYi L. REv. 482
(1971).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See Note, Indictment Sufficiency, 70 CoLum.
L. REv. 876, 881-882 (1970) for a discussion of cases in which an indict-
ment is required. A comprehensive study of the grand jury is contained
as a symposium at 10 AM. CRaU. L. REV. No. 4 (Summer 1972).
9. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
10. See Steele, Right to Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of Criminal
Proceedings, 36 Mo. L. REv. 193 n.1 (1971) and Spain, The Grand Jury Past
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cases are referred to the grand jury. In Detroit, prosecution is al-
ways by information." Within the federal system, cases arising
"in the land or naval forces" are excluded from the requirement of
presentment or indictment by the terms of the Fifth Amendment,12
and the Army has no provision for convening a grand jury.'3 No
case may be referred to trial by general court-martial, however,
until an Article 32 investigation' 4 has been conducted and a law-
yer has advised the convening authority in writing15 whether the
and Present, A Survey, 2 Am. CRan. L.Q. 119 (1964), for a state by state
summary of methods of initiating a felony prosecution. As of 1971 the
prosecutor had the option of proceeding by information in 26 states. See
generally Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). As in the federal system,
use of the information generally does not prevent going before a grand
jury in cases where the magistrate discharges the accused. FED. R. CM.
P. 5.1(b); Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing-Better Alternatives or
More of the Same, 35 Mo. L. REv. 281 (1970).
11. McIntyre and Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony
Cases, 56 A.B.A.J. 1154, 1156 (1970). See also McIntyre, A Study of
Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. CanvR. L.C. & P.S. 463
(1968), for a discussion of the relative roles of police, prosecutor, magistrate,
and grand jury in the charging process.
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, reads, in part, "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces."
13. Beginning in 1963, however, the Department of the Army provided
indictment by grand jury for persons tried in the Courts of U.S. Civil
Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. These courts generally tried de-
pendents of U.S. military personnel and civilian employees of the Army,
although they had jurisdiction to try Ryukyuans and U.S. military per-
sonnel as well. Their legality was approved after being challenged by the
proprietress of the Tea House of the August Moon. Rose v. McNamara,
375 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967). No soldier
was tried in these courts during their twenty-seven year history which
ended with the return of the Islands to Japan, 15 May 1972.
14. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970).
15. 10 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1970). MANUAL FOR COURTS-MAmTL, UNITED
STATES, para. 85b (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM, 1969]. The
recommendation of the Article 32 investigating officer and the advice of
the legal advisor are not binding. In practice, however, these recommenda-
tions are generally followed, as commanders recognize the expertise of
their lawyer and the value of the independent fact finder. (In this connec-
tion see the comment in note 10, supra, as to the similar right of the
civilian prosecutor to dispute the ruling of a magistrate discharging the
accused.) The report of investigation and written advice are included as
part of the record of trial. The appellate courts, therefore, can easily
correct any error of judgment by the convening authority, as they are
aware of the recommendations of the legal advisor and the investigating
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charges state an offense and whether trial is warranted, based on
the report of the investigation.
The classic empirical study of the independence of grand juries
was conducted by Wayne Morse in the early 1930s.10 He concluded
that, nationwide, grand juries tend to rubberstamp the prosecutor's
recommendation, whether made expressly, which ABA Standards
would still permit,17 or indirectly, and that grand juries are a
"fifth wheel" in the administration of criminal justice.1 s Although
grand jury procedures vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, com-
mentators have generally agreed that they do not in practice often
disagree with the recommendation of the prosecuting attorney and,
as at least one practicing attorney has put it, therefore fail to pro-
tect the innocent accused against unfounded accusations.' 0 In a
officer and of the reasons those officers felt a disposition different from
that ordered by the convening authority was appropriate. In several of
the so-called Presidio Mutiny cases, for example, the records of trial on
file with the Clerk of the Army Court of Military Review show that the
convening authority refused to follow the recommendations of the investi-
gating officer that the mutiny charge be reduced to a lesser offense. In a
number of those cases, the Judge Advocate General substantially reduced
the confinement imposed by the court pursuant to his authority under
10 U.S.C. § 874 (1970). Thereafter, appellate review by the Court of Mili-
tary Review resulted in further remission of the punishment, as the court
affirmed a lesser included offense, setting the mutiny conviction aside.
See, e.g., United States v. Sood, 42 C.M.R. 635, petition denied, 20 U.S.C.M.A.
636, 42 C.M.R. 356 (1970), and the companion cases reported at 42 C.M.R.
647, 648, 665, 666, and 668.
16. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (pts. 1-2), 10 OR.. L.
REv. 101, 217, 295 (1931).
17. STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3.5. The Commentary to the Stand-
ards provides at 88, "In situations where the prosecutor must prosecute
an indictment returned by a grand jury, it is especially important that
he be free to express his opinion. A prosecutor who had conducted an
adequate investigation and analyzed the evidence is in a position to furnish
guidance to the grand jury on the law and the weight of the evidence
and should be free to do so whether this leads to a determination to indict
or not to indict."
18. Morse, supra note 16, at 325.
19. Foster, Grand Jury Practice in the 1970s, 32 Omo ST. L. REv. 701(1971); Morse, supra note 16, at 361-364; 8 J. MoosE, FEDERAL PRAcTcE--
CiPEs, CRMnAL RULES, ff 6.02[1l [b] (2d ed. 1972). See Graham & Letwin,
The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-
Policy Observations (pts. 1-2), 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 636, 678-685 (1971);
Steele, supra note 10, at 199-207; Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congres-
sional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section
303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MrcI. L. REv. 1361, 1380
(1969); Moyer, supra note 7, at 11 n.65. The titles of three of the articles
cited by Moyer hint at the problem: Antell, The Modern Grand Jury:
Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965); Coates, Grand Jury:
The Prosecutor's Puppet. Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal Jurisprudence,
33 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 311 (1962); Watts, Grand Jury, Sleeping Watchdog or
Expensive Antique?, 37 N.C.L. REv. 290 (1959).
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recent American Bar Association Journal the Honorable Melvin
P. Antell said, "Realistically, the most demanding task faced by
a conscientious prosecutor in a grand jury room is that of making
a defendant's rights understandable to a grand jury bent on indict-
ing without sufficient evidence but upon great provocation....
[A] ithough the grand jury is exalted as a curb upon arbitrary use
of power, ironically it encourages abuse by allowing the prosecut-
ing authority to carry on its work with complete anonymity and
with effects greatly magnified by the accompanying judicial
rites."
20
The conclusions reached by a group of Duquesne law students
after a study of all aspects of the jury system are instructive:
The theory is that a grand jury will protect a citizen from an
overzealous prosecutor and that factually baseless charges will be
dismissed. The students questioned the factual accuracy of these
assumptions, labelling them as naive. They concluded that the
practice of submitting cases to grand juries is a waste of time and
money, without any substantial offsetting benefits to the defend-
ant. They found that the grand jury is used by some prosecutors
to dismiss criminal proceedings secretly rather than by nolle prose-
qui with approval of court. In other instances, the students con-
cluded prosecutors use grand jury hearings as an opportunity to
have discovery which is denied to the defendant and, worse, as
an occasion for impermissibly suggesting or molding the testimony
of a prospective witness. Even under the federal system, where
there is some opportunity for a defendant ultimately to gain access
to the transcripts of grand jury testimony, they concluded that
the opportunities for misuse of the grand jury process outweigh
the benefits to the defendant which are claimed for the system.2
Without going into detail, it is fair to say that the nature of a
grand jury proceeding is conducive to approval of the prosecutor's
recommendation. It is traditionally a secret proceeding to insure
straightforward testimony and discussion, to avoid needless em-
The preliminary hearing, in jurisdictions where magistrates are not
lawyers, has been subject to similar criticism. See Anderson, supra
note 10. The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 provides that United States
Magistrates shall be attorneys except for part-time magistrates in limited
circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (1970).
20. Antell, supra note 19, at 155, 156. Mr. Antell is a judge of the
County Court in Essex County (Newark), New Jersey. He served eight
years as an assistant in the Office of the Essex County Prosecutor in
Newark during which time he took cases before the grand jury as part
of his duties.
21. Helwig, The American Jury System: A Time for Reexamination, 55
JUDICATuRE 96, 98 (1971).
barrassment to an innocent accused and to prevent flight or per-
jured testimony.22 The need for secrecy has been thought to re-
quire the absence of the accused and his attorney, and, consequent-
ly, the accused has no right of cross-examination, confrontation, or
presentation of evidence.23 The attitude that the trial will provide
the accused his day in court has provided justification for the ex
parte nature of the proceedings as well as for relaxed rules of evi-
dence.24 Even under federal rules and ABA Standards, hearsay is
competent evidence and may provide the sole basis for indictment,
although secondary evidence, by ABA Standards, should be used
only for "cogent reasons."25
In theory, the Article 32 investigation is not an adversary pro-
ceeding, but in practice, the accused is provided all the protection
he would receive if it were.26 The hearing is conducted by an im-
partial officer, usually of the grade of major or higher. The ac-
cused has an absolute right to be present at all sessions of the in-
vestigation and to be represented by a qualified military lawyer,
22. See Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D.
189 (1967); Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MicH. L. REv. 455 (1965);
Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA.
L. REv. 668 (1962).
23. FED. R. CRmn. P. 6 (d); Meshbesher, supra note 22, at 206.
24. 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcF-CIPEs, CRIINAL RuLns 6.02[1] [a](2d ed. 1972); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956); United
States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968); See Indictment Suffi-
ciency, supra note 8.
25. FED. R. Cam. P. 5.1(a); STANDAmws, supra note 4, § 3.6 at 88-89;
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956); See Comment, Indict-
ment Upheld Even Though Founded Solely on Hearsay Evidence, 104 U.
PA. L. Rav. 429 (1955).
26. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970), provides in part:
(a) No charge or specification may be referred to a general court-
martial for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all
the matters set forth therein has been made. This investigation
shall include inquiry as to the truth of the matter set forth in the
charges, consideration of the form of charges, and a recommenda-
tion as to the disposition which should be made of the case in the
interest of justice and discipline.(b) The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and
of his right to be represented at that investigation by counsel.
Upon his own request he shall be represented by civilian counsel
if provided by him, or military counsel of his own selection if such
counsel is reasonably available, or by counsel detailed by the
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the com-
mand. At that investigation full opportunity shall be given to the
accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are avail-
able and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, ei-
ther in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall
examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the
charges are forwarded after the investigation, they shall be ac-
companied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken
on both sides and a copy thereof shall be given to the accused.
See MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 34; Moyer, supra note 7, at 6-11.
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provided free, or a civilian lawyer, if provided by him. Witnesses,
unless unavailable, must be called to testify and are subject to
cross-examination. Sworn statements may be considered if the
witness is unavailable. The accused has a right to make a sworn
or unsworn statement and to present evidence in his own behalf,
including evidence which goes only to extenuation and mitigation.
In determining whether to refer the case to trial, the convening
authority (the commander who orders the charges tried before a
court-martial which he "convenes") must base his decision on the
evidence considered by the Article 32 investigating officer only.2
Confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by an at-
torney at the Article 32 investigation provide the military accused
with an opportunity for discovery not provided a civilian accused.28
Even in the federal system, an accused has no right to access to the
pretrial statements of witnesses until after they have testified.29
Originally, the Jencks Act did not apply to grand jury proceed-
ings, which were discoverable prior to trial upon a showing of spe-
cial circumstances, a particularized need.30 The Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, however, brought statements made to grand
juries within the scope of the act.31 This will make discovery of a
witnesses' grand jury testimony a matter of right once he has
testified at trial. It may also serve to prevent discovery until after
the witness has testified at trial, even upon a showing of particu-
larized need, although one District Court has held to the contrary.32
27. 10 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1970).
28. For a discussion of military discovery, see Saunders, Proposed
Changes in Military Discovery, 10 Am. Csnv. L. REv. 81 (1971).
29. FED. R. CIM. P. 16; Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). See
Comment, Toward Effective Criminal Discovery: A Proposed Revision
of Federal Rule 16, 15 VILL. L. REv. 655 (1970); Comment, Discovery in New
York: The Effect of The New Criminal Procedure Law, 23 SY. L. REv.
89 (1972); ABA PROJECT ON MINmum STANDARDS FOR CnviiAL JusTicE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO DIscOvERY AND PRocEDuRE BEFORE TIL, § 2.1(a)
(i), at 52-56 (1970).
30. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). Comment, Toward Effective Criminal Dis-
covery, supra note 29.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (3) (1970). The Jencks Act was amended to
include a statement made to a grand jury within the Act's definition of
statement, at least for purposes of providing discovery as of right once
the witness has testified at trial. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
tit. I, § 102, 84 Stat. 926, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (e) (1964).
32. United States v. Duffy, 54 F.R.D. 549 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The prohibi-
Restrictive discovery in federal and state courts has led to attempts
to use the preliminary hearing before a magistrate as a means of
discovery. 33 Unlike the Article 32 investigation, however, the gov-
ernment is not required to reveal its entire case at such a proceed-
ing. It need only call enough witnesses to establish probable cause
to bind the accused over to the grand jury or for trial. Addition-
ally, in the federal system, it is common practice for a prosecutor
to avoid the requirement for a preliminary hearing by proceeding
directly to the grand jury, thereby preventing discovery.84 Mr.
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Coleman v. Alabama,85
which holds that, where a state provides for a preliminary hearing
it must provide counsel for an indigent accused, suggests that the
Court held as it did only because it wished to provide the accused
an opportunity to use the hearing for meaningful discovery. 0
Allowing a convening authority to determine who will stand
trial, however, has the appearance of evil-the evil being that the
court-martial appears to be an instrument of discipline rather than
an instrument to aid in creating a peaceful or law-abiding environ-
ment in the military community within which leadership can func-
tion to create discipline and high morale. I, therefore, favor a court
system in which the commander's legal advisor would have the
power to docket cases for trial, followed by a probable cause hear-
ing before a judge assigned to a central judiciary. This probable
cause hearing would replace the present Article 32 investigation,
but the commander and his legal advisor could not overrule the
judge's determination that probable cause did not exist to hold
the accused for trial.3 7
JURY SELECTION
The military jury differs from the civilian jury in that it almost
always consists of less than twelve members,88 only a two-thirds
tion against discovery of a witness' statements until after he has testified
at trial is contained in paragraph (a) of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). The
definition of statement given in paragraph (e) by the terms of that para-
graph applies to paragraphs (b), (c) and (d). Duffy concludes, therefore,
that it does not apply to paragraph (a). Originally paragraph (a) dealt
only with statements made to government agents, but the phrase, "to an
agent of the government" was deleted by the 1970 amendments. This sug-
gests that paragraph (a) may apply to statements made to grand juries.
33. See Anderson, supra note 10; Note, Preliminary Hearing in The Dis-
trict of Columbia-An Emerging Discovery Device, 56 GEO. L.J. 191 (1967).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e) (1970); Weinberg & Weinberg, supra note 19.
35. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
36. Id. at 25.
37. Hodson, supra note 6, at 10.
38. The general court-martial jury must consist of not less than five
members; the special court-martial jury, not less than three members. 10
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vote is necessary to convict, and anything less than a two-thirds
vote will acquit the accused.39 Generally speaking, a civilian jury
consists of 12 members who must not only agree unanimously to
convict, but must also agree unanimously to acquit. The right to
jury trial has now been extended to the states,40 and the United
States Supreme Court has recently upheld the validity of state
provisions providing for less than a twelve-man jury,41 and less
than a unanimous verdict.4 2  The Court's approach in these de-
cisions was goal oriented. As it noted in Williams,". . . the essen-
tial feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the
accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group
of laymen, and in the community participation and shared respon-
sibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or in-
nocence.143
Despite the goal of community participation, methods of select-
ing civilian juries have resulted in practice in the selection of a
U.S.C. § 816 (1970). A military judge assigned to the United States Army
Judiciary, a separate unit under the jurisdiction of The Judge Advocate
General, will also be detailed to every felony-type court-martial, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 816, 819 (1970). Army Regulation 27-10, 2-16b (Change 8, 7 Sept.
1971). Except in a capital case, the accused may request to be tried by
military judge alone. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970). Such requests are routinely
granted, although the statute requires approval of the military judge.
It is unclear whether approval may be withheld only when the accused
does not understand the significance of the request or in other circum-
stances as well. This issue is now before the United States Army Court of
Military Review in United States v. Winston, CM 427964.
The military is exempt from the Sixth Amendment requirement of jury
trial and the court-martial is a creature of statute. See, e.g., Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942). Van Loan, The Jury, The Court-Martial, and
the Constitution, 57 CoPmELL L. REV. 363 (1972). See generally Remcho,
Military Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need for Reform, 47
IND. L.J. 193, 200-207 (1972). Nevertheless, Constitutional requirements
are relevant in determining what type of jury Congress ought to provide
absent overriding considerations of military necessity, which are the jus-
tification for exception from the Sixth Amendment requirement in the first
instance.
39. 10 U.S.C. § 852 (1970). MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 74d(3).
The death penalty is mandatory for the offense of spying, 10 U.S.C. § 906
(1970), and may well be valid since it is mandatory. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972). Unanimity is required for a finding of guilty in such a
case. A less than unanimous vote results in an acquittal.
40. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
41. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
42. Johnson v. Louisiana, 407 U.S. 932 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404 (1972).
43. 399 U.S. at 100.
conservative group of the more affluent members of the com-
munity.44 Until the recent enactment of the Federal Jury Selec-
tion Act,45 it was common for federal jurors to be selected by the
key-man system, whereby the jury commissioner would contact the
local banker, the local minister, the local businessman, and per-
haps the local superintendant of schools and ask them to nominate
people for jury duty.46 The federal act, which requires the use of
voting lists and a jury wheel, if followed in practice, would elimi-
nate the use of the key-man system for federal but not state ju-
ries.47 In most states jury commissioners are free to select the jury
list from whatever source they choose.4 s Although the federal
act prevents disqualification of any juror who can speak English
and meets certain other objective criteria, e.g., does not have a
felony charge pending against him,49 most states still require jury
commissioners to select only persons who meet other subjective
standards, for example, "only such persons as the selecting officers
know, or have reason to believe, are law-abiding citizens of ap-
proved integrity, good character, sound judgment and intelli-
gence."50
Use of subjective criteria has been criticized as a source of racial
and economic discrimination.5 1 Nevertheless, the American Bar
Association would permit a higher level of selectivity than mere
44. Kairys, Juror Selection: The Law, A Mathematical Method of Anal-
ysis, and a Case Study, 10 A-m. Cami. L. REv. 771 (1972). See Note, The
Congress, The Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of Title I and II of
the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1966); Kuhn, Jury Dis-
crimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1968). According to
an editorial in the Washington Post for August 22, 1972, for example, petit
jurors in Arlington, Virginia, are selected from sources such as "church and
country club memberships, and political parties' rolls."
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1970). See McKusick & Boxer, Uniform
Jury Selection and Service Act, 8 HARV. J. LEGIs. 280 (1971), for a compari-
son of the federal act with the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in August, 1970, at the request of the American Bar Association,
whose House of Delegates approved the Uniform Act Feb. 1971.
46. See Lindquist, An Analysis of Juror Selection Procedure in the
United States District Courts, 41 TEmp. L.Q. 32, 35 (1967); Mills, A Sta-
tistical Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District Court,
22 Min. L. Ruv. 205 (1962).
47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863, 1864 (1970).
48. ABA PROJECT ON Mnmum STAmNmms FOR ClmnNAL JUsTICE, STAND-
umws RELATING TO TiA BY JURY, § 2.1 (a) at 48-51 (1968). Compare
McKusick & Boxer, supra note 45, at 282 n.10.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1970).
50. FLA. STATS. AxN. § 40.01(2) (West 1961); STANDARDS RATIG TO
Tmr.A BY JURY, supra note 48, § 2.1(b) at 51-57; The Congress, the Court
and Jury Selection, supra note 44, at 1072-1080 and nn.25-27.
51. The Congress, The Court and Jury Selection, supra note 44, at
1072-1080; Kuhn, supra note 44, at 266-282.
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literacy, "if this can be accomplished through the use of objective
criteria," to insure selection of a jury which is capable of under-
standing and intelligently evaluating the evidence.52 The United
States Supreme Court said recently:
It has long been accepted that the Constitution does not forbid the
State to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors. The
States remain free to confine the selection to citizens, to persons
meeting specified qualifications of age and educational attainment,
and to those possessing good intelligence, sound judgment, and
fair character. "Our duty to protect the federal constitutional
rights of all does not mean we must or should impose on states
our conception of the proper source of jury lists, so long as the
source reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suit-
able in character and intelligence for that civic duty."5 3
The effects of use of the key-man system and use of subjective
qualification criteria are pointed up in litigation currently in prog-
ress in Alexandria, Virginia, challenging the make-up of that city's
grand jury.54 The senior judge of the Corporation Court selects
the grand jury of sixty members and he is required to select per-
sons of honesty, intelligence and good demeanor who are suitable
in all respects to serve as grand jurors. Although the judge testi-
fied he compiled the list from a cross-section of "men and women,
black and white, Protestants, Catholics and Jews," 55 defense attor-
neys claim they will show that fifty-eight of the sixty are property
owners, fifty-two of whom own property in Alexandria of an aver-
age value of $75,000; the average age of the group i's fifty-nine,
the youngest person being forty-three years old; the average an-
nual income is $50,000 with a minimum of $10,000; the average
educational level is five years of college; that thirty-five of the
sixty are active in local politics, twelve are bankers, ten are in real
estate, twelve are business owners, sixteen are business executives;
and none are housewives, students or unemployed. 56 The judge
testified he knew everyone on the list well enough to say hello
and that he had used substantially the same list for ten years,
adding and deleting names as necessary.57
52. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 48, § 2.1(b) at 57.
53. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
54. Sunday Star (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 13, 1972, § D at 1, col. 1.
55. Evening Star and Washington Daily News (Washington, D.C.), Aug.
15, 1972, § B, at 1, col. 4.
56. Sunday Star, supra note 54. Evening Star, supra note 55.
57. Evening Star, supra note 55. Early cases challenging the composi-
tion of juries have centered on systematic exclusion of a group, on, for ex-
The members of a court-martial (the military jury) are selected
by the commander, who is required by law to select members
who, in his opinion, "are best qualified for the duty by reason of
age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial
temperament."58  Given the goal of random selection from a
cross-section of the community, the present law which allows the
commander to select military jurors, and even to exclude enlisted
men unless they are requested by the accused, should be changed.
Although military juries resemble their civilian counterparts in
most states, and although judicial remedies exist in the military to
prevent or overturn unlawful command control,59 this is not good
enough. The military system has the appearance of evil and the
potential for abuse. I favor a military judicial system divided
into districts, with the court serving all units in that district. Ju-
ries would come from the units in the area. The judge, a member
of an independent judiciary, would call on units serviced by him
to submit a specified number of names of personnel of specified
grades, commissioned and enlisted. Enlisted grades 1 and 2, and
probably 3, should not be eligible for jury duty because of their
inexperience in the military community. When an accused wants
a jury, names submitted by the units would be put in a jury
wheel, and an appropriate number would be drawn. Once a name
was drawn, that juror could be eliminated from the jury only by
challenge for cause or by peremptory challenge. Members of the
jury would be required to fill out a questionnaire in advance so
that voir dire could be shortened and those clearly ineligible for
jury duty, by objective standards, such as witnesses, members of
the accused's immediate unit, those who are junior to the accused,
those who are unavailable because of the importance of their duties,
etc., could be excused by the judge. As the hung jury benefits
neither the government nor the accused, I would retain the present
two-thirds requirement for findings of guilt, an acquittal resulting
ample, economic or racial grounds. Recent litigation, however, frequently
challenges the array on the ground that it was not chosen from a cross-
section of the community or was not chosen from a group likely to result
in representation of a cross-section of the community or the jury. Support
for this approach may be found in dicta in Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972),
as well as in earlier decisions of the Court.
58. 10 U.S.C. § 825 (d) (2) (1970). Enlisted men are eligible for courts-
martial duty only when requested by an enlisted accused, in which case
one-third of the members must be enlisted men unless eligible enlisted
members cannot be obtained on account of physical conditions or military
exigencies. 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1) (1970).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Clayton, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 248, 38 C.M.R. 46
(1967).
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when less than two-thirds vote to convict. 60 This system would
accomplish the random selection of jurors from a cross-section of
the military community. Elimination of the lowest two or three
grades is an objective qualification to insure a jury of sufficient
maturity of experience and judgment to be capable of determining
guilt or innocence with reference to the mores and needs of the
military community.61
APPELLATE REviEW
Appellate review does not appear to be a Constitutional right,
though a state may not discriminate, as against the poor, if appel-
late review is made available to some of its citizens. 62 Research
by the American Bar Association indicates that all states now pro-
vide for some type of appellate review of convictions for significant
crimes, except for Louisiana, which has no provision for appeal
from a misdemeanor conviction in which less than six months con-
finement or a $300 fine is adjudged.63 Nevertheless the military
system which requires automatic review of all courts-martial is
unique.64 In fiscal year 1972 the Army Courts of Military Review
considered 3,156 cases, affirming the findings and sentence in only
60. The rule that acquittal results if less than two-thirds of the jurors
vote to convict protects the accused against command control. No one
member can hang the jury, forcing a second trial before a different jury, by
persisting in a vote of guilty. Further, as the court members vote by se-
cret written ballot in closed session, the convening authority does not know
who voted to acquit or who voted to convict, thus making it impossible
for him to pin responsibility for the verdict on any particular member of
the court. The same protections exist when the court determines the sen-
tence, as less than a unanimous vote is required except to impose the
death penalty.
61. Hodson, supra note 6, at 9-10; Remcho, supra note 38, contains a
thorough analysis of the problem of jury selection and proposals for change
now before Congress as well as the author's proposals for improvement
in the present system of selecting jurors.
62. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-688 (1893); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956); In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1971); ABA PROJECT
ON MUMix UM STANDARDS FOR CRMiNAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
CRn\IINAL APPEALS, § 1.1 at 15 (1970).
63. STANDARDS RELATING TO CRiminAL APPEALS, supra note 62, § 1.1 at
17; LA. STATS. ANN., CONST. art. 7, §§ 10, 29 (West Supp. 1972); State v.
Wilkes, 250 La. 55, 193 So. 2d 783 (1967), dismissing appeal on transfer
from 187 So. 2d 519 (Cir. Ct. App. La. 1966).
64. STANDAmDS RELATING TO C1imINAL APPEALS, supra note 62, § 1.1 at
18-19. A discussion of military appeals is found at Moyer, supra note 7,
at 26-32.
2,293 cases.65 Senator Bayh has criticized the military system of
appellate review as "antiquated and unnecessarily slow moving."0 6
In 1963, however, the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty
and Administration of Justice concluded:
The military experience demonstrates the essential fact that free
access to appellate review is an indispensable feature of an enlight-
ened system of criminal justice .... The experience gained ...
in the administration of military justice should be consulted in
every serious consideration of new appeals procedures in the civil
courts.67
A sentence by a military court to a dishonorable or bad-conduct
discharge or a year or more confinement triggers two levels of re-
view. After preparation of a verbatim record, the legal advisor to
the convening authority prepares a written review for use by the
convening authority in determining whether to approve the find-
ings of guilty or the sentence. The written review is required to
contain "a summary of the evidence .. .opinion as to the ade-
quacy and weight of the evidence and the effect of any error or
irregularity respecting the proceedings, and a specific recomenda-
tion as to the action to be taken. Reasons for both the opinion
and the recommendation will be stated. s08 An incomplete or mis-
leading review by the legal advisor is grounds for appellate relief,
and in fiscal year 1972 the Court of Military Review returned 37
cases to the field for a new review and a new action by the con-
vening authority.69
After examining the legal advisor's review, the convening au-
thority has authority to set the findings of guilty of the sentence
aside, in whole or in parlt, or to reduce (but not to increase) the
quantum of punishment either by reducing it in severity, or by
suspending the execution of all or a portion of the sentence.70 Al-
though he may take no action on findings of not guilty, he has
complete discretion to disapprove findings of guilty. Further he
may approve findings of guilty only if the court was legally con-
stituted throughout the trial and had jurisdiction over the offenses
and the person tried, the accused had the requisite mental capacity
at the time of trial and at the time of commission of the offense,
65. Fiscal Year 1972 Report of General and Special (BCD) Court-Mar-
tial Data, supra note 3.
66. Bayh, supra note 5, at 21.
67. Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Criminal Justice, 116-17 (1963), cited in Moyer, supra
note 7, at 32 and n.225.
68. MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 85b.
69. Fiscal Year 1972 Report of General and Special (BCD) Court-Mar-
tial Data, supra note 3.
70. 10 U.S.C. § 864 (1970); MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 88a.
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the competent evidence of record establishes the accused's guilt of-
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and there
were no errors which materially prejudiced the substantial rights
of the accused.71
Senator Bayh favors elimination of this initial review, at least
partly because it is time consuming.72 The convening authority's
action is normally taken shortly after preparation of the verbatim
record,73 which is required in all cases involving a punitive dis-
charge or more than six months' confinement.7 4 While the present
initial review by the convening authority provides a quick remedy
for obvious errors, does not unduly delay receipt of the record
by the Court of Military Review, and can never leave the accused
in a less favorable position, the convening authority should no
longer be required to review the record to determine the legality
of the proceedings. However, he should have the opprotunity to
review the record and restore the accused to duty immediately if
he determines that such action is in the best interest of the service
and that the accused is a good prospect for rehabilitation.75
71. MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 86b.
72. Bayh, supra note 5, at 21.
73. During fiscal year 1972 the average time lag between trial of a gen-
eral court-martial and action by the convening authority was 59.8 days,
which includes the not inconsequential time required for the reporter to
prepare the verbatim record. Fiscal Year 1972 Report of General and Spe-
cial (BCD) Court-Martial Data, supra note 3. An accused may request
that his sentence to confinement be deferred pending action by the con-
vening authority. 10 U.S.C. § 857 (d) (1970). No punitive discharge may
be executed until appellate review is completed. 10 U.S.C. § 871(c) (1970).
Accused receives full pay at least until action by the convening authority
and, in the discretion of the latter, may continue to draw his pay until
completion of all aspects of appellate review. 10 U.S.C. § 857 (a) (1970);
MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 88d.
74. 10 U.S.C. § 854 (1970); MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 15b.
75. The convening authority commander may know of a place in his
organization where the accused can be effectively rehabilitated, making
further confinement unnecessary as, for example, where accused pos-
sesses a special skill and his misconduct appears to have resulted from his
youth and inexperience, rather than from a fixed pattern of criminal be-
havior. In a sense, the commander becomes the accused's probation officer.
A related problem is whether to permit the prosecution to appeal un-
favorable interlocutory rulings of the trial judge to the convening au-
thority. 10 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1970); MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 67f.
This appeal somewhat resembles the government appeal in the federal sys-
tem, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970), which, however, appears to be broader. For a
discussion of the government appeal in the military see Floyd, Government
In any case in which the convening authority approves a punitive
discharge or one year's confinement or more, he must forward the
case to the Judge Advocate General for referral to the Court of
Military Review.70 Such cases must be considered by the Court,
which sits in Washington, D.C. 77 The Army Court of Military Re-
view consists of thirteen senior officers, all lawyers with an average
experience of more than 20 years in criminal justice work. Civilian
attorneys may be appointed to the court.78 It may sit en banc but
generally sits in panels of three judges.79 Unlike appellate courts
in most civilian jurisdictions, it has broad powers. It must weigh
the evidence, decide controverted issues of fact and judge the
credibility of witnesses just as the triers of fact do at trial, recog-
nizing that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. It may af-
firm findings of guilty only if convinced by the admissible evi-
dence that guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.80
The Court of Military Review also has authority to determine
the appropriateness of the sentence.81 Although the ABA recom-
mends that appellate review of sentences be available at least
whenever review of the conviction is available,8 2 neither federal
courts nor more than half of the state courts appear to have this
authority,8 3 except in a limited category of cases. In fiscal year
1972 the Army Court of Military Review affirmed the findings but
reduced the severity of the sentence in 634, or approximately 21%,
Appeals in Military Criminal Cases, 24 JAG J. 129 (1970); United States v.
Frazier, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 444, 45 C.M.R. 218 (1972). I favor permitting the
prosecution to appeal certain interlocutory rulings provided the appeal is
to an appellate military court rather than to the convening authority.
See STANDARDS RELATING TO CimvnxAL APPEALs, supra note 62, § 1.4 and
33-40, which authorize prosecution appeals of certain interlocutory rulings.
76. 10 U.S.C. § 865 (1970). General court-martial convictions resulting
in a sentence, as approved, of less than a year's confinement and no dis-
charge must also be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for review in
his office. Such cases may be referred to the Court of Military Review.
General court-martial cases which are not referred to the court, as well
as all summary court-martial convictions and special court-martial con-
victions where a BCD is not approved, are subject to further review in
the Office of the Judge Advocate General upon petition by the accused.
10 U.S.C. § 869 (1970). Some form of relief was granted in 92 of 488 cases
received under this provision in fiscal year 1972.
77. 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (1970).
78. 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (1970).
79. Id.
80. 10 U.S.C. § 866 (c) (1970); MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 100.
81. Id.
82. ABA PnoaEcT ox Mnmum STAumws roR C~nvnNAL JUSTCE,
STANinARDs RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW or SENTENCES, § 1.1, at 7 and
13-15 (1968).
83. Id. at 13-15; 8 J. Moonn, FmERAL PAcTIcE--CpEs, C~nvmTrAI, RULES,
32.09 (2d ed. 1972); United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir.
1971).
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of the cases reviewed by it.84 Some states, as well as the ABA
Standards, allow appellate courts to increase the sentence if the ac-
cused appeals sentence appropriateness and the court finds the
sentence is too lenient.85 In the military, however, the sentence
may never be increased on appeal.8 6 Additionally, although the
Supreme Court has determined it is not unconstitutional to impose
a higher sentence at a second trial following appeal, if based on
events subsequent to the initial sentencing stated in the record,8 7
such an increase in the sentence is not permitted in the military.88
The United States Court of Military Appeals, a three-judge Court
whose members are civilians appointed by the President, reviews
certain categories of cases.8 9 That Court must review all cases in-
volving a general officer or a death sentence, or cases which are
certified by the Judge Advocate General.90 Its principal work-
load comes from petitions filed by accused whose cases have been
reviewed by the Court of Military Review.9 1 At present there is
84. Fiscal Year 1972 Report of General and Special (BCD) Court-Mar-
tial Data, supra note 3.
85. STANDARDs RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note
82, § 2.3 at 55. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE, art. 26, § 134 (Michie repl. vol.
1966); ALAs. STATS. § 12.55.120 (Michie Supp. 1971). Such legislation
has been held constitutional by both states, Robinson v. Warden, 8 Md.
App. 111, 258 A.2d 771 (1969), and federal courts, Robinson v. Warden,
455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972), even in light of North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969). In a recent decision the Court took a narrow view
of Pearce when it ruled that the Constitution does not require that the
sentence imposed following trial in an "inferior" court be the ceiling on
the sentence following trial de novo in a higher court. Colten v. Ken-
tucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112-120 (1972).
86. 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (1970) ; MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. 100.
87. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
88. 10 U.S.C. § 863(b) (1970); MCM, 1969, supra note 15, para. l10a (2).
89. 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970),
90. 10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (2) (1970).
91. 10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (3) (1970). The Judge Advocate General may
direct the Court of Military Review to review certain general court-martial
cases not entitled to automatic review (see note 76, supra); in these few
cases, the accused may not petition the Court of Military Appeals for re-
view. 10 U.S.C. § 869 (1970). An accused may also petition the Judge
Advocate General for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evi-
dence or fraud on the court, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (1970); or the Secretary of
the Army for clemency, 10 U.S.C. § 874 (1970); the Army Board for the
Correction of Military Records, 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1970); or except for a
discharge adjudged by a general court-martial, the Army Discharge Re-
view Board, 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1970); or further relief in federal courts,
see, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
no direct route from the Court of Military Appeals into the federal
court system. I favor providing for a writ of certiorari from the
United States Supreme Court to the Court of Military Appeals.
This would bring military justice under the umbrella of the Su-
preme Court, which is terribly important, for that should remove
military courts from the stigma of being an executive, or what is
worse, a political court.
The number of appeals in the civilian system is increasing ap-
parently as obstacles to such appeals are diminishing.92 During
the first six months of Fiscal Year 1972, criminal appeals filed in
the U. S. circuit courts of appeal were up 25% from the first six
months of Fiscal Year 1971,03 and the criminal caseload comprised
44.5% of the caseload of those courts in that period.94 Obstacles
to appeal have traditionally centered on the costs of criminal ap-
peals, such as court costs, costs of a transcript, and attorney's
fees. 95 The military has been fortunate in that Congress has pro-
vided for free appellate counsel for any accused whose case is be-
fore the Court of Military Appeals or Court of Military Review. 0
There are, of course, no court costs, and a copy of the verbatim
record prepared in each case is routinely furnished to the accused.
CONCLUSION
Largely because of the intensive media coverage of the unpopu-
lar Vietnam conflict, the administration of military justice has
probably come under closer and more continuous public scrutiny
than any other single system of criminal justice in history. 7 There
92. STANDAPDS RELATING TO Camm AL APPEALS, supra note 62, § 1.1 at
19-20.
93. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1972 Semi-Annual Report
of the Director, 6 (1972).
94. Id. at 7.
95. STANDARDS RELATING TO CRInxINAL APPEALS, supra note 62, § 1.1
at 20.
96. 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1970).
97. The ABA Standards were formulated after in-depth studies and
research which disclosed gross inadequacies and unfair practices in the
administration of civilian criminal justice. But these disclosures have not
generated wide-spread public demands for reform. Former United States
Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, chairman of the ABA committee
charged with implementing the Standards, has reported that the task is
an onerous one. "Not only are we faced with overhauling an antiquated
and neglected system but also with bringing uniformity to 50 different
systems interlaced with a federal system." Clark, The Implementation
Story-Where We Must Go, 55 JunicATuRE 383 (1972). On the other hand,
although they may not have had the benefit of objective research or study,
many critics of military justice are clamoring for reform. Some of the
critics have been less than objective-using military justice as a conveni-
[voL. 10: 51, 1972J Courts-Martial and the Commander
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
have been widespread criticism and demands for reform. While
much of the criticism is unfounded, nonetheless, there are features
of military justice which are vulnerable to attack; for example, the
statutory requirement that the commander select the members of
the court, even though carried out with scrupulous fairness and
impartiality, has the potential for and the appearance of evil. Fair
minded commanders-and there are many of them-would prefer
to be relieved of this responsibility.
In coming years the system of military justice should be changed
to eliminate even the appearance that the commander can influ-
ence the outcome of a trial. But change for the sake of change, or
because of a belief that "pure" justice cannot exist in the military
structure, may well sacrifice aspects of a system which provides
real advantages for the accused. In the area of post-trial review,
for example, total elimination of the commander would deprive
the accused of an important opportunity for rehabilitation. An-
thony Amsterdam has noted that there is an important difference
between discussion of the rights an accused has and the actual
treatment he gets.98 An objective comparison of military and ci-
vilian systems at this functional level shows that the military
system measures up quite well. Unfair criticism tends to cloud the
issues and may hinder the goal of providing the military with a
system of justice which will not only protect the rights of the indi-
vidual, but will also help to create an environment within which
the armed forces can carry out their mission.
ently visible vehicle, a "whipping boy," through which they can express
their violent displeasure with the Vietnam conflict. Even some of the ob-
jective critics have tended to study military justice in a vacuum, compar-
ing it with some non-existent ideal, rather than with systems of justice as
they actually function on a day-to-day basis in our civilian jurisdictions.
98. See note 7 supra.
